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Abstract
This article investigates the incentives to unbundle operations and infrastructure in the railway industry in
a two-country model with international network effects from the viewpoint of national governments. The
analysis shows that the decision to unbundle institutionally or organizationally with separated accounts
depends crucially on the importance of cross-border transportation. For a sufficiently high importance
of cross-border transportation, national governments choose accounting separation. However, national
governments are stuck in a Prisoners’ dilemma and would be better off coordinating on a separated
industry structure. This result justifies major policy initiatives by the European Union but explains also
actions of national governments in implementing these initiatives.
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1. Introduction
Transportation facilities are an essential part of a country’s infrastructure. Efficient traveling and
transportation of production and consumption goods are essential requirements for efficient trading within
and across countries. Among the different transportation modes railways are one of the most important,
e.g., in Europe exist 212,000 km of railways compared to only 68,000 km of motorways. Railways offer
not only a comprehensive network to transport passengers and freight, but have also more than 700,000
employees in Europe (EC, 2012). Historically, railways in Europe were operated by state-owned monop-
olists managing the infrastructure and the transportation facilities. Even though most of the European
countries privatized their railway operations, the markets remained relatively closed with a low degree of
competition. In recent years, the European Commission started to promote railways and increased liber-
alization efforts to open up national markets (EC, 2001). Recently, the European Commission published
a White Paper (EC, 2011) on the road map to a single European transportation area in which the com-
mission highlights the key role of railways in achieving a resource-friendly transportation area. In order to
reach efficient and liberalized markets, the issue of (un)bundling the infrastructure and operations is hotly
discussed. This article contributes to this discussion by focusing on the role of national governments and
shows that national governments may have incentives to keep the home market operator integrated with
the infrastructure owner even if no efficiency gains are present. The main argument is that governments
want to create national champions who are strong for competition abroad.
It is undisputed that unbundling is necessary to rule out cross-subsidies from access-charges and
public funds to the operational activities. However, it is often argued that regulating the access charges
and separating the accounts into two firms is sufficient, and that the ownership plays only a minor role.
In the process of liberalizing the European market, national governments play a key role. Governments
were free to choose between the models of institutional separation (IS) and organizational separation with
separated accounts (AS) for their national railway systems. Some countries opted for IS (e.g., UK and the
Netherlands) while others chose AS (e.g., Germany and Italy) leaving the infrastructure and operations
in the same hands.1 In both models the access charges for the infrastructure are regulated by national
regulators. Unfortunately, it is unclear which factors drive the decisions of the national governments.
This article analyzes the topic of unbundling in the railway sector by describing the industry in a
stylized two-country model with international network effects. The equilibrium analysis focuses on na-
tional governments who choose between accounting and institutional separation. Because access prices
are regulated, strategic price mechanisms play no role in the decision. Instead, I analyze the role of
non-price related factors. Non-price discrimination can be done by providing poor quality, setting tech-
1See IBM (2011) and Online Appendix B for an overview of the different organization forms across European countries.
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nical and safety requirements, or the ability to allocate time schedules. I assume a perfectly regulated
environment with respect to prices. However, an integrated firm with separate accounts holds all unreg-
ulated residual control rights which it can use to discriminate competitors (see e.g. Economides, 1998;
Sand, 2004, for a more general discussion of non-price discrimination). In contrast, an institutionally
separated infrastructure provider has no incentives to discriminate between the competitors. I focus on
long-distance passenger traffic and freight transportation because I am interested in the cross-country
effects of bundling infrastructure with operations. The crucial factor of my analysis is that consumers
value the network density of an operator, i.e., the number of routes and their travel frequency, in the
home country and abroad. A denser network offers more possibilities to travel to a specific destination
and shortens the waiting time for connection trains.
The analysis shows that the decision of governments about the unbundling alternatives depends on
their objective function. A government who is only interested in the welfare generated in the home
country is always better off with IS. However, a government valuing to some degree the profits of the
incumbent abroad chooses AS if the international network effects are sufficiently large. An unilateral
integration with separate accounts gives the integrated firm a strategic advantage in offering network
densities to consumers at home and abroad. The resulting higher profit compensates for the loss in
consumer surplus. The government accepts less competition in order to create a national champion who
is strong for competition abroad. Unfortunately, both governments have the same incentives, choose AS
in equilibrium and are worse off compared to a situation in which both separate institutionally. This
result shows the need for coordination mechanisms on the level of the European Union. Accounting
separation may not be enough, it helps national governments to slow down efforts in opening their
national market in the transition period. Obviously, these incentives to restrict competition are only
present with incumbents that are internationally active. A result that explains the different organization
structures among European countries.
The general discussion about unbundling is based on two competing arguments. The opponents argue
that transaction costs2 between the operator and infrastructure owner are lower in an integrated firm,
whereas the proponents argue that vertical integration hinders competition which leads to inefficiencies
in the sector. The hybrid model of accounting separation should serve both arguments. The advantages
should be reached without the disadvantages. It is highly controversial if such an outcome is possible,
because ownership allows the access to all residual control rights by which competitors can be discrim-
inated. I do not consider the transaction cost argument in my analysis. The only mechanism at work
is a barrier to competition. Even though I take only a socially negative effect into account, I find that
national governments have incentives to unilaterally integrate their home market activities with separate
2Transaction costs broadly defined describe any kind of costs that are related to a transaction between the two entities.
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accounts.
This article is directly related to the small literature on the optimal structure in the railway industry
as analyzed by Friebel et al. (2008). Different to my article they analyze the role of economies of scale in
combination with strategic effects via a combined price-setting mechanism for the organization decision
from the railway firm’s perspective. My article has also similarities to the question of airline and airport
integration or collusion as analyzed by Barbot (2009) who also uses a combined price-setting analysis in
her model.
The empirical analysis of vertical integration is in general associated with difficulties because the rele-
vant information are scarce and comparable accounting data is usually not available. Therefore, academics
performed efficiency analysis based on comparable output measures in order to evaluate the organiza-
tion form of operators. The empirical findings are rather mixed. Merkert et al. (2012) analyze European
countries and find that vertical separation raises transaction costs (modestly). Similarly, Bitzan (2003)
and Growitsch and Wetzel (2009) find that separating operations and infrastructure increases the costs.
Laabsch and Sanner (2012) investigate the influence of bundling on the attractiveness of railways com-
pared to other transportation modes for nine European countries. The authors show that full institutional
separation results in a significant decline in the modal share; pointing to efficiency gains of integrated
operators.
In contrast, Cantos et al. (2010) provide evidence that efficiency increased with ownership separation
in Europe. Friebel et al. (2010) observe positive effects of reforms in the sector, but find similar to
Driessen et al. (2006) no consistent results with respect to different types of separation. Finally, Ivaldi
and Mc Cullough (2001) find no cost complementary among operation and infrastructure for US freight
railroads.
My analysis has familiarities with models of strategic trade competition. Brander and Spencer (1985)
show that export subsidies help to enhance the competitive position of domestic firms in a third market.
Finally, one can interpret network density as the quality of an operator. Therefore, the model is related
to the literature on non-price discrimination (e.g. Economides, 1998; Sand, 2004) and quality competition
(e.g. Jaskold Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983).
Section 2 introduces the model, discusses the incentives for vertical integration and derives the equi-
libria. In Section 3, I discuss the results of the model. The final Section 4 concludes.
2. The model
Consider two countries in which consumers are uniformly distributed on lines with length and density
equal to one. All consumers demand one unit of the transportation service with valuation v. Additionally,
consumers value the network densities of their operator in both countries. Two operators are located at
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both ends of the lines in both countries. I consider Operator 1 to have its home base in Country 1 whereas
Operator 2 has its home base in Country 2.
By assuming Hotelling competition, I rule out intermodal competition. However, this assumption is
not crucial for the following analysis. I discuss the consequences of relaxing this assumption in Section
3. Furthermore, the model assumes that both competitors are present on both markets. Unfortunately,
we observe only a low degree of competition in long-distance passenger traffic in Europe. However, this
observation is different for freight transportation. Competition has intensified significantly in recent years.
For example, new competitors increased their market share in Sweden (45 percent), Estonia (30 percent)
and Romania (26 percent) significantly. Even though not all entrants were originally the incumbents
of other countries, market consolidation lead to the situation that other incumbents became the most
relevant competitors within single European countries (DB, 2011).
The utility function of a consumer located at point xj in Country j is defined as:
Uxj =
 v − p1j + df1j + ef1,−j − txj if using Operator 1v − p2j + df2j + ef2,−j − t(1− xj) if using Operator 2.
In the utility function fij stands for the network density of Operator i in Country j, and t for the
degree of differentiation between the operators. The price of Operator i in Country j is denoted by pij .
d and e symbolize the valuation of density, defined by the combination of the number of routes and their
frequency, in the home country and abroad respectively.
Network density increases the coverage and quality of the operators network because railway operators
do not offer point to point connections per se. In contrast, they manage a network of connections. Hence,
a higher density offers more connecting trains after the travel with a lower waiting time. These effects
seem to be important for both, passenger traffic and freight transportation. This idea can be visualized
by two exemplary network structures, a hub-and-spoke network and a matrix structure in Figure 1. In
the hub and spoke, and matrix examples a passenger has to switch trains in order to travel from A to
B. Hence, the more often the operator serves the individual routes and the more routes the operator
offers, i.e. the denser the network is, the lower is the time it takes to travel or transport goods from A
to B. Consequently, the denser the network the higher is the quality of the operator perceived by the
customers. Furthermore, for passenger transportation the operator with the denser network of routes is
able to offer a more suitable timing of the return trip; thereby, increasing the perceived quality of the
two-way ticket.
Customers may be able to mix between operators, and choose different operators for the single legs.
However, this comes at a cost. Buying tickets at different locations, and an uncoordinated timing of arrival
5
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Figure 1: Exemplary stylized network structures
and departure decrease the comfort of traveling. Furthermore, mixing operators involves an additional
risk for the customer that is also present in the airline market. In case of a delay the customer has to
buy a new ticket for a connecting train. By traveling with only one operator the customer avoids that
risk because typically the operator is responsible for the whole route and offers a new connecting train at
no costs. Similarly, transferring freight from one operator to another involves higher costs compared to
straight-through-processing. Schmidt (2001) provides some evidence by showing that interline shipment
is more expensive for customers compared to single line shipment. Even though the possibility of mixing
may set a limit to the pricing decision of the operators, a positive effect of density on consumer utility
remains.
Even though cross country effects may exist on the supply as well as on the demand side, I concentrate
on the demand side in the model. For simplicity, I assume that d and e are identical for all customers. This
assumption is similar to assuming that d and e are distributed according to some distribution function
among customers but independently of the position xj on the line. In this case, d and e can be interpreted
as the expected value of the distribution functions.
Deriving the marginal traders from the indifference conditions yields the following demand functions
of Operator i in Country j:
xij =
1
2
+
p−i,j − pij + d(fij − f−i,j) + e(fi,−j − f−i,−j)
2t
.
The infrastructure providers in the respective country offer time slots that grant operators the right to
use the infrastructure. Infrastructure providers are regulated with respect to prices and offer slots at
marginal costs. Hence, the infrastructure provider is not a player in my analysis. The number of time
slots is directly related to the network density. Therefore, I use both terms synonymously. The operators’
costs are composed by a marginal cost per seat, the access charge of the infrastructure provider and a
cost factor quadratic in the network density (kf2ij). For simplicity, I assume the marginal costs of the
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infrastructure provider and the marginal costs of the operator per seat to be zero.
Because the access price is regulated, double marginalization effects or strategic price effects cannot
play a role. However, bundling of services of the infrastructure provider and the operator within one firm
leaves the firm the unregulated control rights. I assume that with AS these rights allow the discrimination
of the competitor using price-independent mechanisms which results in an increase of the cost per time
slot of the competitor by y. These additional costs are not transferred to the integrated firm, it simply
increases the costs of the competitor. Throughout the model I assume for simplicity that y is “low” (see
the Appendix for the details).
A report of the European Commission provides evidence for such behavior. The report states that
“new entrant RUs reported many cases of discrimination in access to rail related services (...). Concrete
examples of discriminatory practices on access to tracks and rail-related services include (...) denied
access to central stations for international passenger trains competing with those of the incumbent,
no information nor ticketing facilities in stations for these same trains; denied or very limited access to
freight terminals when no alternatives are available” (EC, 2010, p.12). The OECD adds that the non-price
discrimination practices might include “offering only undesirable time slots for the operation of trains or
imposing unnecessary conditions for access. It might also involve conducting maintenance at times which
affects the rivals trains or resolving delays in a manner which favors its own trains at the expense of
the rivals” (OECD, 2005, p. 57 ). Safety regulations are another potential mechanism. A regulator may
want to take these mechanisms into account but fail to do so because of the inherent difficulties (OECD,
2005). Merkert et al. (2008) provide some evidence by showing that the German model of AS increases
the uncertainty faced by the competitors.3
Given these information, the profit functions of the operators are defined as:
Πij =
{
pijxij − kf2ij if competitor is separated from infrastructure provider in Country j
pijxij − kf2ij − yfij if competitor is integrated with infrastructure provider in Country j
Πi =
∑
j
Πij . (1)
I impose an assumption on the parameter space that ensures the stability of the equilibria (see Dixit
(1986) and the Appendix A.1 for the derivation).
Assumption 1.
(d+ e)2 < 9kt
Figure 2 summarizes the timing of the game. Governments decide about the unbundling alternatives
in their countries simultaneously in the first stage, operators choose the network densities fij in the
second stage and compete in prices simultaneously in the third stage.4
Because the model is a two country model, the objective function of the governments follows not
straightforwardly. In general, I assume governments to maximize national welfare. However, it is unclear
3Online Appendix B provides additional (weak) evidence supporting this assumption by showing that market entry,
measured by the ACCESS index published in IBM (2011), tends to be more difficult in AS countries compared to IS
countries.
4All results are robust to a change of the timing. The related calculations can be found in the Online Appendix A.
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Unbundling decision of governments
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Operators choose network densities
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Operators set prices
Figure 2: Timing of the game
whether the national governments value the profit of the national operator generated in both markets or
whether they favor the profits generated by both operators in the home market. Therefore, I propose a
welfare measure that weights the profits of the home market operator generated abroad and the profits
of the foreign operator generated in the home market country j:
Wj = CSj + Πjj + αΠj,−j + (1− α)Π−j,j ,
CSj denotes the consumer surplus in Country j. There exist good reasons to believe that the government
of a country is rather interested in the overall profits of the home country operator than in the profit the
foreign competitor generates. Large parts of the value creation may take place in the operator’s home
country or the tax system hinders governments to raise taxes from foreign operators of the same scope
as from home market operators. An alternative interpretation of the welfare function is that operators
invest in lobbying activities in the sense of Grossman and Helpman (1994) and that the weights follow
according to the lobbying investments.
In order to solve the model for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, I calculate profits and wel-
fare for the three different combinations of organization structures, i.e., complete separation, accounting
separation in one country only, and accounting separation in both countries.
2.1. The price-setting stage
Maximizing profits with respect to the prices and solving the resulting system of equations gives:
pij =
3t+ d(fij − f−i,j) + e(fi,−j − f−i,−j)
3
∀i, j.
The second order conditions are always fulfilled. Quite intuitively, the larger the density advantages in
both countries the more the operator can raise its price. A larger density difference implies a larger
difference in quality; hence, a higher price can be sustained. Because the different settings affect only the
costs of time slots, the price-setting stage is identical for all three settings.
2.2. Complete separation
The complete separation case, i.e., institutional separation in both countries, is the baseline case, none
of the operators has to take additional costs into account. Using the optimal prices from the price-setting
stage in Eq. (1) gives the profit functions of the operators in the second stage:
Πi =
∑
j
(
[3t+ d(fij − f−i,j) + e(fi,−j − f−i,−j)]2
18t
− kf2ij
)
.
From these profit functions the subsequent reaction function for Operator i in Country j follow directly:
fij =
3t(d+ e)− (d2 + e2)f−i,j − 2def−i,−j + 2defi,−j
18kt− d2 − e2 .
The second order conditions are fulfilled under Assumption 1. Since operators offer substitutable services,
one may expect that densities of the competitors are strategic complements. However, the opposite is
true, densities of competitors are strategic substitutes, i.e.,
∂fij
∂f−i,j
< 0 and
∂fij
∂f−i,−j
< 0, while the densities
of the same operator across countries are strategic complements, i.e.,
∂fij
∂fi,−j
> 0. The densities are
associated with externalities across countries. Densities exert a positive effect on the profits abroad and
increase the marginal revenues from densities. The opposite is true for densities of the competitor. These
characteristics should be kept in mind for the following analysis.
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Solving the system of network density reaction functions leads to equal sharing of the markets and
the following optimal prices and densities:
psepij = t ∀i, j
fsepij =
d+ e
6k
∀i, j.
These results are quite intuitive and replicate standard results from the economics of network industries
(e.g., Shy, 2001). In the complete separation setting, both companies are completely symmetric and offer
the same network densities. Hence, the relative evaluation of operators by the consumers depends only
on the differentiation between them, which is the only factor that influences the price. Nonetheless, the
larger the consumer valuation of densities, the larger are the potential gains for operators of increasing
the network density; therefore, both choose a higher density. Clearly, higher costs of network densities
decrease the demand via the same mechanism.
The profits, consumer surplus and welfare follow directly:
Πsepij =
18kt− (d+ e)2
36k
∀i, j,
CSsepj =
∫ x1j
0
(v − p1j + df1j + ef1i − tx)dx+
∫ 1
x1j
(v − p2j + df2j + ef2i − t(1− x))dx
=
12kv + 2(d+ e)2 − 15kt
12k
∀j,
W sepj =
36kv + 4(d+ e)2 − 9kt
36k
∀j.
Consumer valuation of network densities decreases profits because of the rent-seeking characteristics of
the competition model. The higher d and e are the denser are the networks. Because operators are
symmetric, none of the operators has a relative advantage in equilibrium. Even worse, both have to bear
the higher costs. Operators would be better off coordinating on lower network densities. A larger k has
the opposite effect, operators offer lower densities and the profits increase.
The reverse is true for the consumer surplus. Consumers favor densities; hence, consumer surplus
increases in d and e, and decreases in k and t via the same mechanism. The positive effect of d and e on
consumer surplus dominates for the welfare payoff.
2.3. The effects of accounting separation
2.3.1. Accounting separation in one country
Within the proposed framework I can analyze the role of accounting separation. In this section I
describe first the consequences of AS in one country, and turn then to the effects of AS in both countries.
The technical details are delegated to the proofs of the Lemmas in the Appendix.
In the following, I use the example of AS in Country 1. The results hold with a reversed order for
AS in Country 2. Integration with separated accounts in Country 1, raises the cost per time slot for the
foreign Operator 2 in Country 1 by y. While the price setting stage of the game is unaffected by the
change, the increased costs influence the density choice, leading to a lower network density of Operator
2 in Country 1.
The lower density of Operator 2 decreases marginal revenues of network density of Operator 2 in
Country 2, while it increases marginal revenues of Operator 1 in both countries. This leads to a lower
density of Operator 2 in Country 2 and a higher density of Operator 1 in both countries. These changes
in the network densities influence the price game in the third stage. The difference in densities gives
Operator 1 a competitive advantage who is, therefore, able to demand higher prices.
Consequently, the changes in network densities also affect the firm profits, consumer surplus and
welfare. For a sufficiently low cost increase y the following results hold:
Lemma 1. If Government 1 chooses accounting separation and Government 2 institutional separation,
the following results hold in comparison with complete separation:
1. The profit of Operator 1 increases; the profit of Operator 2 decreases.
2. Consumer surplus decreases in both countries.
3. Welfare in Country 2 decreases; welfare in Country 1 increases if α and e are sufficiently high.
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Proof. See the Appendix A.2.
A high valuation of international network densities increases the competitive advantage of Operator
1 which leads to higher profits that compensate for the loss of consumer surplus. This is a somehow
surprising result because barriers to competition are usually perceived as bad for a society. However in
this setting, the government of Country 1 may have an incentive to accept less competition in the home
market in order to strengthen its operator for competition in Country 2. It may have incentives to create
a national champion. This result holds even though the integration decision implies additional costs that
are wasteful for society, i.e., these costs are real costs and not a tax from which a government profits.
The integration decision involves a negative externality for Country 2; hence, it is at the cost of the
government of Country 2.
2.3.2. Accounting separation in both countries
With accounting separation in both countries the costs of network density for Operator 1 in Country
2 are higher, too. Compared to AS in Country 1 only, the advantage of Operator 1 diminishes. The
increased costs lower the marginal revenue for densities of Operator 1 in both countries and Operator 1
lowers both types of densities. The contrary is true for Operator 2. Compared to complete separation,
both operators choose a higher density at home and a lower density abroad.
Lemma 2 summarizes the consequences for the operator profits, consumer surplus, and welfare for a
sufficiently low y.
Lemma 2.
1. If Government 1 has chosen accounting separation and Government 2 chooses accounting separation
as well, then the result of Lemma 1 hold for Operator 2 and Country 2.
2. If both governments choose accounting separation, consumer surplus, and welfare are lower in both
countries compared to a separated industry structure. Operator profits are identical.
Proof. See the Appendix A.3.
Even though the direct consequences of the unbundling decisions are independent of each other,
each decision exerts a negative externality on the competitor and the consumers. This externality offsets
the positive effect of AS. However, consumers in both countries are worse off because of a lower network
density. Consequently, welfare is lower with accounting separation in both countries compared to complete
separation. This implies that welfare is lower even though it might be higher for the “integrated” country
in the asymmetric case.
2.4. The unbundling decisions
Based on the preceding analysis of the three different settings, the equilibrium of the unbundling deci-
sions from the perspectives of the national governments follows directly. Lemma 1 states that governments
do not choose AS unilaterally if α and e are small. Such a parameter constellation leads to lower welfare
irrespectively of the choice of the other country’s government. Hence, the resulting equilibrium has a
separated industry structure in both countries. This equilibrium is pareto-optimal for both governments
compared to any other industry structure.
In contrast, operators choose AS unilaterally if α and e are sufficiently large. By Lemma 2 this leads
under the same conditions to AS of the competing operator and, hence, to AS in both countries in
equilibrium. AS works as a barrier to competition which favors the home country operator but is at the
cost of the competitor and the consumers.
Unfortunately, both governments are in equilibrium worse off than with complete separation. The
desire to create national champions decreases individual national and overall welfare. The additional
domestic profit of the home country operator cannot offset the loss of consumer surplus and profit of
the competitor. Hence, governments are confronted with a Prisoner’s dilemma. Both have incentives to
choose accounting separation but would be better off in coordinating on institutional separation.
Proposition 1. The resulting industry structure depends on the weight of the welfare function and the
importance of network densities:
• If α or e are sufficiently small, the industry ends up in complete separation. The equilibrium is
pareto-optimal.
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• If α and e are sufficiently large, the industry ends up in accounting separation in both countries.
Governments are confronted with a Prisoner’s Dilemma; welfare in both countries is lower compared
to complete separation.
In the case of high importance of international network densities, both governments want to make their
operator strong in competing with the foreign operator and opt for AS. Unfortunately, this leads to AS
in both countries and none of the governments can take advantage of the integration decision. AS abroad
decreases the profit of the home market operator at the same amount as AS at home raised it. However,
the consumers stay worse off which decreases welfare.
This result has familiarities to models of strategic trade competition. Brander and Spencer (1985)
show that export subsidies help to enhance the competitive position of domestic firms in a third market.
In equilibrium producing countries impose a subsidy, even though they are jointly suboptimal. Instead of
a quantity subsidy, I introduce an additional cost for the foreign competitor which makes the supply of
density for her more costly. A lower density decreases the competitive position of the foreign firm in both
countries and leaves the domestic firm better off. Furthermore, competition takes place in the domestic
markets and influences not only firm profits but also consumers.
3. Discussion
Vertically integrated operators (with separate accounts) emphasize very often the importance of effi-
ciency gains, or transaction cost savings, in a vertically integrated firm. Transaction cost savings, defined
as gains from joint production5, within an integrated firm may come from several sources. Variable costs,
and lower fixed costs are the most prominent ones6. Against the background of the model, fixed cost
savings are cost savings that are unrelated to the allocation of the number and quality of the slots. Fixed
cost savings can be realized for example through better coordination in joint investments of the setup of
train paths or simply by avoiding the duplication of certain administrative functions. In contrast, variable
costs savings are all savings that are related to the allocation of the number and quality of the slots.
Examples of areas where variable costs may be lower within an integrated firm are the negotiations about
timetables7, the track access agreements or performance regimes, or the safety planning and enforcement
process (Merkert et al., 2012); though many of these areas may also affect the fixed costs of the two firms.
By neglecting cost savings the model biases against AS. However, introducing fixed or variable costs
savings does not influence the comparative statics of the model. They only decrease the cut-off values of α
and e beyond which AS becomes profitable for national governments.8 Consequently, they may influence
the evaluation of the equilibrium. If either of the cost savings is sufficiently high, the IS equilibrium
may not be welfare inferior anymore. Lower fixed costs may compensate for the loss in consumer surplus.
Similarly, variable costs savings may lead to lower prices, an increase in consumer surplus and firm profits;
potentially outweighing the social costs of restricted access to the infrastructure and benefiting the whole
society.
However, the existence of lower costs or efficiency gains within a integrated firm is unclear9. This
article analyzes potential effects of AS in the absence of such cost savings. It is rather obvious that
operators favor bundling even if these cost savings do not exist as long as bundling allows the firm
to discriminate competitors in other ways. More surprisingly, the key result of my model is that also
governments may favor AS, even if it is a pure anti-competitive effect and not associated with any kind
of cost saving. The payoff to the national government may increase by unilaterally deciding to separate
only the accounts of the home market incumbent even if bundling of infrastructure and operations is
associated solely with additional costs for the competitor and without any productive function. For large
cross-country spill-overs via the network effect the discrimination of the entrant comes with advantages for
the national operator abroad which outweighs the additional costs for consumers. National governments
5Joint production avoids “market” transactions of two separated organizations.
6A potential double marginalization effect, and hold-up problems that are related to specific investments can be also
described as part of the transaction costs. However, they can be only of minor importance because the access price of the
infrastructure owner is typically regulated.
7For the same price tracks at better times are more valuable.
8Obviously, introducing fixed costs has only level effects and do not influence the density and price choice of the oper-
ators. Introducing variable costs savings gives a relative advantage to the home-market operator similarly as the non-price
discrimination effect of AS. Thereby, both effects take on the same direction.
9See the discussion of the empirical literature on p. 4.
11
have incentives to create a national champion. In a globalizing world the importance of cross-border
transportation is of high importance, highlighting the relevance of this result.
However, this argument holds for both operators, and in equilibrium both governments choose the
bundled structure and are worse off than with complete separation. This outcome emphasizes the need for
supranational cooperation, justifies the efforts of the European Union to liberalize the markets, and the
introduction and strengthening of the European Railway Agency (ERA). The international cooperation
serves as a mechanism to commit to discriminatory-free access10.
In the current debate about the structure of the market in Europe some operators complain that the
opening of national markets takes place at different pace among European countries (e.g., IBM, 2011),
e.g., in some countries the passenger segment is still closed for foreign operators. The model delivers
two explanations for this observation. First, countries differ with respect to their perceived importance
of international traffic. For example, against the background of the analysis it is not a surprise that the
United Kingdom was the pioneer among European countries in liberalizing their railway market. Because
of Britain’s geographical characteristics, cross-border transportation by train is just not a big issue. The
island is connected by train to continental Europe only by the Eurotunnel and a few ferries. Furthermore,
the strategy of the national incumbents differ. For example, the dutch national incumbent Nederlandse
Spoorwegen did not enter any international market and is only active in the home-market. Consequently,
creating a national champion in the sense of the model is not in the interest of the dutch government.
Second, AS may serve as a hidden mechanism to restrict access. Even though governments committed
to open national markets, governments with operators active in other European markets have incentives
to unilaterally delay the process in order to strengthen their home market operator in the short run.
Additional regulatory initiatives are always a step behind; therefore, AS helps national governments to
slow down the opening of their market in the transition period11.
The model ignores an additional important factor in the railway market, intermodal competition. One
may argue that bundling the services with separate accounts increases the attractiveness of the railway
market. Assuming that railways are associated with less greenhouse gas emissions compared to the cars,
trucks, planes or ships, increasing the modal share of railways comes with an additional benefit for the
society. However, accounting separation decreases the attractiveness of the railway sector if AS allows
discrimination of competitors. The model shows a lower consumer surplus compared to a completely
separated industry structure. Hence, it decrease the attractiveness of the railway market as a whole
which leads to a lower share of railways among all transportation modes. This result is also reflected by
Table A.4 which shows that the network density is in sum lower in each country compared to complete
separation.
A transfer of the results on other industries depends crucially on cross-country spill-overs. Without
spill-overs the model becomes a simple single country analysis. Even though these spill-overs seem to
be important for railways, this may be different for other network industries. For example, electricity
generators need also access to the infrastructure in order to distribute energy. However, railways need
not only a network of tracks but additionally a network of connections, something that is not present on
the energy market.
4. Conclusion
The main contribution of the article is to shed light on the role of governments in the discussion of
institutional separation, or access restrictions in more general, on the railway market. The incentives of the
private companies are relatively obvious: being able to restrict access decreases the degree of competition
and increases profits. The analysis shows that even national governments choose accounting separation for
their national incumbent if international spill-over effects are large. Even though this is associated with
a lower degree of competition, the additional profits of the incumbent abroad compensate for welfare
losses at home. The lower degree of competition at home gives the incumbent a stronger position to
compete abroad and to gain higher profits. Because the incentives for both governments are identical,
both governments choose accounting separation.
10Three of the five goals of the ERA are related to competition and non-discriminatory access: “(...) encouraging market
entry by reducing administrative and technical barriers”, “(...) opening domestic rail passenger transport to competition”,
and “(...) encouraging market entry and ensuring non-discrimination through better governance of the infrastructure.”
11A simple way to mitigate the problem in the two-country setup would be to offer access only on a reciprocal basis, as
done by Hungary in the passenger market.
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This result is true even though I do not take the main argument favoring bundling into account:
transaction cost savings. In my modeling approach, AS is solely associated with additional costs for the
competitor. Even though there is no productive function of accounting separation, it is associated with
advantages for the governments. Unfortunately, the resulting equilibrium is associated with lower national
and overall welfare compared to separated structures.
Even though the final evaluation of the organization form depends crucially on potential efficiency
gains within an integrated firm, this result shows that even national governments may hide behind this
argument in order to strengthen their national incumbent.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Stability condition of the equilibrium
Beside the validity of the second order conditions I need to ensure the stability of the equilibrium (see
Dixit, 1986). 
˙f11
˙f12
˙f21
˙f22
 =

∂2Πi
∂f211
∂2Πi
∂f11∂f12
∂2Πi
∂f11∂f21
∂2Πi
∂f11∂f22
∂2Πi
∂f12∂f11
∂2Πi
∂f212
∂2Πi
∂f12∂f21
∂2Πi
∂f12∂f22
∂2Πi
∂f21∂f11
∂2Πi
∂f21∂f12
∂2Πi
∂f221
∂2Πi
∂f21∂f22
∂2Πi
∂f22∂f11
∂2Πi
∂f22∂f12
∂2Πi
∂f22∂f21
∂2Πi
∂f222


f11 − fsep11
f12 − fsep12
f21 − fsep21
f22 − fsep22

For stability, the coefficient matrix should have negative eigenvalues. This is the case if:
9kt > (d + e)2.
I impose this as an assumption for my analysis. The assumption ensures not only stability, but also the
fulfillment of the second order conditions and the non-negativity of operators’ profits.
A.2. Proof Lemma 1
AS in Country 1 increases the costs of network densities of Operator 2 in Country 1. This cost increase
changes the reaction function of Operator 2 in Country 1 to
f21 =
3t(d+ e)− (d2 + e2)f11 − 2def12 + 2def22 − 9ty
18kt− d2 − e2 .
Even though all other reaction functions remain unchanged, this change affects the marginal revenues of
the other network densities.
Table A.1 summarizes the resulting equilibrium network densities. Superscript 1 denotes AS in Coun-
try 1 only, superscript 2 denotes AS in Country 2 only, and superscript b denotes AS in both countries.
For the sake of simplicity I define M1 = 9kt− (d+ e)2 > 0, and M2 = 9kt− (d− e)2 > 0.
f1ij Country 1 Country 2
Operator 1 fsepij +
M1(d
2+e2)+2de(d+e)2
4kM1M2
y fsepij + de
9kt
2kM1M2
y
Operator 2 fsepij − M1M2+9kt[9kt−(d
2+e2)]
4kM1M2
y fsepij − de 9kt2kM1M2 y
Table A.1: Densities of Operator i in Country j with AS in Country 1
The changes in the network densities influence the price game in the third stage. The difference in
densities gives Operator 1 a competitive advantage who is, therefore, able to demand higher prices. The
effects on prices and market shares are summarized in Table A.2.
Country 1 Country 2
Operator 1 psep11 [1 + 3d
9kt−(d2−e2)
2M1M2
y] psep12 [1 + 3e
9kt+(d2−e2)
2M1M2
y]
p1ij Operator 2 psep21 [1− 3d 9kt−(d
2−e2)
2M1M2
y] psep22 [1− 3e 9kt+(d
2−e2)
2M1M2
y]
Operator 1 xsep11 + 3d
9kt−(d2−e2)
4M1M2
y xsep12 + 3e
9kt+(d2−e2)
4M1M2
y
x1ij Operator 2 xsep21 − 3d 9kt−(d
2−e2)
4M1M2
y xsep22 − 3e 9kt+(d
2−e2)
4M1M2
y
Table A.2: Prices and market shares of Operator i in Country j with AS in Country 1 only
These equilibrium prices and densities allow the derivation of profits, consumer surplus and welfare.
I use these measures to calculate the difference per unit increase of y evaluated at y → 0. I denote the
resulting differences as Γ. This approach assumes y to be low and asks whether the introduction of such
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costs evaluated at y = 0 gives positive or negative differences in the variables of interest.12 I show this
procedure exemplary for the profit of Operator 1 and deliver afterwards only the relevant measures for
the other functions of interest. From the equilibrium densities follows the profit difference of Operator 1:
Π11 −Πsep1 =
1
48kM21M
2
2
{4(d+ e)(18kt− (d− e)2)M1M22
+ 3y
[
(d2 + e2)M1M2(18kt− (d2 + e2)) + 4d2e2(M1M2 + 162k2t2)
]}y.
Dividing by y and taking the limit gives:
ΓΠ11−Πsep1 ≡ limy→0
Π11 −Πsep1
y
=
(d+ e)[18kt− (d+ e)2]
12kM1
> 0.
Table A.3 shows that the higher network densities lead to a higher profit of Operator 1. Operator 1
sets higher prices and gains higher market shares; hence, he earns higher profits. The reverse holds for
Operator 2.13
ΓΠ1ij−Πsepij Country 1 Country 2 Sum
Operator 1 18dkt[9kt−d(d+e)]−(d+e)(d−e)
2M1
12kM1M2
3et[9kt−e(d+e)]
2M1M2
> 0 (d+e)[18kt−(d+e)
2]
12kM1
> 0
Operator 2 − 18dkt[9kt−d(d+e)]−(d+e)(d−e)2M112kM1M2 −
3et[9kt−e(d+e)]
2M1M2
< 0 − (d+e)[18kt−(d+e)2]12kM1 < 0
Table A.3: Evaluation of profit differences compared to complete separation
Consumers traveling with Operator 1 experience higher densities and higher prices. The contrary is
true for consumers traveling with Operator 2. However, for both groups the negative effect dominates
and the consumer surplus is lower with AS in one country compared to complete separation.
ΓCS11−CSsep1 = −
d
4k
< 0
ΓCS12−CSsep2 = −
e
4k
< 0
Consequently, welfare in Country 2 is also lower. In contrast to this negative effect, the effect on
welfare in Country 1 is unclear and depends on α and e.
ΓW 11−W sep1 = α
(d+ e)(18kt− (d+ e)2)
12kM1
− d
4k
T 0
ΓW 12−W sep2 = −α
(d+ e)(18kt− (d+ e)2)
12kM1
− e
4k
< 0
In order to show that ΓW 11−W sep1 becomes positive with increasing e, one can plug in the lowest and
the largest possible e to ΓW 11−W sep1 and then check the derivative for monotonicity:
ΓW 11−W sep1 (e = 0) = d
9ktα− (3− α)(9kt− d2)
12kM1
T 0 (A.1)
lim
e→√9kt−d
ΓW 11−W sep1 → +∞ (A.2)
∂ΓW 11−W sepj (e)
∂e
= α
9kt[18kt− (d+ e)2] + (d+ e)4
12kM21
> 0 (A.3)
Notice that even though (A.1) may be either positive or negative (depending on d and α) (A.2)
12In the case of integration in one country only, the approach is identical to taking the derivative of the variable of interest
with respect to y and evaluating the derivative at y = 0.
13The table also shows that everything Operator 1 wins is lost by Operator 2. However, note that this observation is due
to the fact that the profit functions have a minimum at y = 0 and marginal profits are therefore zero.
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increases to infinity as long as α > 0. Given monotonicity of ΓW 11−W sepj with respect to e, there exists an
unique e0 for which ΓW 11−W sepj = 0 whenever ΓW 11−W sepj (e = 0) < 0 as long as α is strictly positive.
Additionally, because
∂Γ
W11−W
sep
j
(e)
∂e increases in α, e
0 decreases in α.
A.3. Proof Lemma 2
Accounting separation in both countries is the last setting which I need to consider. In this case, the
reaction functions of network densities of both operators abroad change to:
fij =
3t(d+ e)− (d2 + e2)f−i,j − 2def−i,−j + 2defi,−j − 9ty
18kt− d2 − e2 ∀i 6= j.
Again, all second order conditions are fulfilled under Assumption 1. Compared to AS in Country 1 only,
the advantage of Operator 1 diminishes. The increased costs lower the marginal revenue for densities
of Operator 1 in both countries and Operator 1 lowers both types of densities. The contrary is true for
Operator 2. Compared to complete separation, both operators choose a higher density at home and a
lower density abroad.
With AS in both countries, operators have a density advantage in their home country and a disad-
vantage equal in size abroad. Compared to complete separation, operators are able to set higher prices
at home but have to suffer lower prices abroad as long as d > e. Consequently, for d = e no operator has
a net advantage and prices are identical to complete separation.
Country 1 Country 2
fsep11 +
(d−e)2
4kM2
y = fsep12 − 18kt−(d−e)
2
4kM2
y =
Operator 1
f111 − de 9kt2kM1M2 y f112 −
M1M2+9kt(9kt−(d2+e2))
4kM1M2
y
f bij
fsep21 − 18kt−(d−e)
2
4kM2
y = fsep22 +
(d−e)2
4kM2
y =
Operator 2
f121 + de
9kt
2kM1M2
y f122 +
M1(d
2+e2)+2de(d+e)2
4kM1M2
y
psep11 [1 +
3(d−e)
2M2
y] = psep12 [1− 3(d−e)2M2 y] =Operator 1
p111[1− 3e 9kt+(d
2−e2)
2M1M2
y] p112[1− 3d 9kt−(d
2−e2)
2M1M2
y]
pbij
psep21 [1− 3(d−e)2M2 y] = p
sep
22 [1 +
3(d−e)
2M2
y] =
Operator 2
p121[1 + 3e
9kt+(d2−e2)
2M1M2
y] p122[1 + 3d
9kt−(d2−e2)
2M1M2
y]
xsep11 +
3(d−e)
4M2
y = xsep12 − 3(d−e)4M2 y =Operator 1
x111 − 3e 9kt+(d
2−e2)
4M1M2
y x112 − 3d 9kt−(d
2−e2)
4M1M2
y
xbij
xsep21 − 3(d−e)4M2 y = x
sep
22 +
3(d−e)
4M2
y =
Operator 2
x121 + 3e
9kt+(d2−e2)
4M1M2
y x122 + 3d
9kt−(d2−e2)
4M1M2
y
Table A.4: Densities, prices and market shares of Operator i in Country j with AS in both countries
Table A.4 shows that the differences in prices and densities between AS in both countries and AS in
Country 1 only are identical to the differences shown in Tables A.1 and A.2. From this observation follows
that the results from Lemma 1 hold equivalently for the case of AS of Operator 2. The same mechanisms
are at work. There is no additional effect of AS in Country 1 on the (individual) incentives to choose AS
in Country 2 and no changes to the incentives compared to Lemma 1.
However, even though the direct consequences of the unbundling decisions are independent of each
other, each decision exerts a negative externality on the competitor and the consumers. Therefore, the
comparison of complete separation and accounting separation in both countries is important for the
equilibrium derivation. Table A.5 shows the relevant terms for the profits of the operators.
Lemma 1 and 2 state that everything Operator 1 wins by choosing AS is lost by Operator 2. Hence,
the profits of operators neither increase nor decrease compared to a separated industry structure. The
intuition behind this result is that AS gives both operators a strategic advantage in their home countries
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ΓΠbij−Πsepij Country 1 Country 2 Sum
Operator 1 (d−e)[18kt−(d
2−e2)]
12kM2
− (d−e)[18kt−(d2−e2)]12kM2 0
Operator 2 − (d−e)[18kt−(d2−e2)]12kM2
(d−e)[18kt−(d2−e2)]
12kM2
0
Table A.5: Evaluation of profit differences compared to complete separation
but a strategic disadvantage abroad. These advantages and disadvantages offset each other and the overall
profits are identical to the case of separation.14
The effect on individual profits within a country depends on the relative size of d and e. It may be
natural to assume that d > e. This assumption yields the intuitive outcome that home market profits
increase while profits generated abroad decrease. For d < ethe opposite holds true. In this case the
international network effects dominate the national network effects and operators compensate lower home-
market profits with higher profits abroad.
As a direct consequence of the results above, consumer surplus and welfare are lower with accounting
separation in both countries compared to complete separation.
ΓCSbj−CSsepj = ΓW bj−W sepj = −
d+ e
4k
< 0 ∀j.
14Again this is because the profit function have their minimum at y = 0; hence, the first derivative is equal to zero.
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